disastrous course THE month that has elapsed since Labour Party conference has catastrophe for the labour movement that event was.
Some of those who stood and applauded Neil Kinnock's nationalistic outpou rings in his speech, and voted for the policies that accompanied it, did so because they honestly, and wrongly, believed they were right. But many many others, particularty in the trade union delegations, did so exclusively and solely because they believed they election. Kinnock's line might not be right but at least it was clever electorally. The ridiculous singing of 'Here we go' after Kinnock's speech — for the persougnt to wreck the miners strike represented the desperate delegates to win the next election.
But it is clear, only four weeks later, that this en tire operation was for nothing. More than that it was a alsaster. Labour took no step forward in the polls after its conference - on the contrary the Tories narrowed the gap on Labour to two points. The Tories held their most confident and ag gressive conference — not to mention the most right wing - for three years. Opinion polls show a sudder lurch of Alliance coalition with the Tones rather than with Labour. In short Labour Party conference was an unmitigated disașter even at the elementary level of building party popularity.
It is the last results that show just why the party conference was a castrophe. it is not that Labour is interested in a coalition with the SDP/Liberals - or at least it shouldn't be. It is that the sudden violent lurch of Alliance supporters from favouring a coalition with Labour to favouring a coalition with the Torries shows the huge swing to the right in the centre ground' of politics which Kinnock has allow. ed Thatcher to succeed in.
The explanation is simple. Kinnock declared the need for 'consensus' - which meant accepting most of the changes wrought in the Thatcher years of British politics. Thatcher replied at the Tory ference by simply shifting that consensus three paces to the right.
Owen has achieved essentially the same with the Liberals. He deliberately provoked a confrontation with the Liberal Party over Britain's absolute necessity to possess nuclear weapons. He was perfectiy prepared to see a damaging decline in Alliance support, which is just what has occurred. rather than have any policy even mildly damaging to British capitalist interests accepted. The 'consensus' British capital will accept is so tar to the right that even Kinnock, at present, cannot openly espouse it.
The result is now invitable. Having praised Kinnock to the skies for his miners, for launching the witch hunt against Militant, for isolating the Wapping struggle, the papers are launching a campaign to outfiank Kinnock to his right. Thatcher is ruthlessly built up. The papers which have been praising Kinnock for the last three years are now going to turn very nasty indeed. Because, after all, if we are to have a right wing consensus then Thatcher is a much more reliable guardian of it than Labour.
The reality is the following - and its conse quences have to be very carefuily absorbed by the labour movement. A year ago the most likely result of an election would have been a hung parliament or a narrow Labour victory. At that time Thatcher was still reeling from the effect of the miners strike. But if present trends continue the most likely outcome of a general election could be another Thatcher government. Kinnock has completely and utterly wasted the entire advantage Labour gained from the tremendous battering_ the Tories took at the hands of the miners. Far from being clever Kinnock's road nas been a complete catastrophe for the labour movement.
The game is not lost by any means. The Tories still face formidable economic problems — which could wreck them. It may still be possible to break through the obstacle to working class struggle which Kinnock represents. But if it is left to Kinnock then Thatcher is going to win the next election:
Undoubtedly the understanding of that is going to take some time to get through - and as far as most trade union leaderships are concerned nothing is going to happen before the general election. But when that understanding does get; through there will have to be a reckoning. Both: for the policies and for the individuals responsible. shown just what lou may would win the hope will of percentage supporters towards favouring a logii ment back be attacks on the again being involved. continued from pl:
I can understand that some comrades view a change of the absennonıst polley as a betrava. ot republican principles. Some ot Steel that a republican making such change can no longer call itselt republican'. If there are delegates here who teel like this I would remind you that the Army AuthoriOI Oglaigh hEireann, assembled in a General Army conventon, has democraticall made a judgement on this issue and that Oglaigh na hEireann has remained united in its determination to pursue the armed struggle and is united in its confidence in us and our abilit! to pursue the political struggle.
The decisions of a General Army Convention are not binding on Sinn Fein Ard-Fheiseanna, but the logic if we change the abstentionist policy must be applied also to your attitude io the Armv And the which would dictate withdrawal of suport from Sinn Fein if decisions go against you Means that vou nave already decided to withdraw solidarity and support from the IRA and the armed struggle l do not believe that any republican could take such a decision and attend this Ard-Fheis.
For my part, I can tell you that, although 1 am supporting the Ard Chomhairle motion, if the vote goes against us I will be as much a as I am today before that vote, and I will continue to work for this organisation with total commitsingle-minded determination.
The spectre of a 'split' is being raised to panic and intimidate us. It is aimed at unnerving people who want to remove abstenHons oul wao dOlt warl uit price for this to be a split. Talk or speculation about the split is aimed at making these people draw This leadership is not going to blackmailed by any such speculation. We have been elected by you to give leadership and we will not be found lacking in the task of leading and uniting this consider the Ard Chomhairle motion to be a most Van important one because of the clear direction it gives in relation to future strategy but 1 consider it also as opening up, in a formal sense the internal debate which commenced a few Ard-Fheiseanna Liberation Our experience has taught us that our struggle - and this atfects every aspect of the struggle - canOl be built merely on the republican perception of things. We have had show to consistentiy pitch our struggle at the level of people's understanding and we have had to develop it from this common denominator, taking into account, in an objective way, all the forces and factors It would be much easier, of course, if all the Irish people, or a large section of them, were born with our perception and our view of things, but this is not the case. If it was, there would be little need for a republican struggle. But there is a need and it we want to win then there is a fundamental need to make it a people's struggle. Of who course, if we have no concept of winning we can remain as we are - a party apart trom the people, proud of our past but with little involvement in the present and only dreams for the future.
In the 6 counties, in regards to Stormont Westminster, sizeable section of nationalists and republicans feel no affinity with those institutions. In the 26 Counties, it is different. It is a massive mistake to presume that republican attitude to Leinster House is shared by any more than a small section of our people, especially the citizens of this state, who might otherwise be open to our policies on all other issues. It must also be clear that the reconquest of Ireland, much less a British withdrawal, calliul be completed without the support of more of these people. Reality Of course we have a duty to point out to these people the shortcomings and the history of the present system, and we have a daly to wil taelm to our view, Dul we can only do so at their level of understanding and we can only proceed from the objective reality of their consciousness.
James Connolly dealt with this issue in 1897, in a criticism of abstentionism in the shan Van Vocht. In an editorial, the Shan Vocht rejected Connolly's views because an oath of allegiance was involved, but they also called for the question to be debated and they recorded their agreement with views on the social questions.
Earlier, the IRB (Irish Republican Brotherhood) had debated this issue and a secion of them actually attempted to develop a ballot box and dynamite strategy. At this time, unlike 1916 or today, they failed to develop their phase ol armed struggle.
I give these examples merely to that the debate among „evo ulonane aout Damclod tion in parliaments predates partition. Partition has merely reinforced the problem and distorted it in much the same way as it has affected every other aspect of life on this island.
Dogma Connolly's criticism of abstentionism in 1897 and his implicit approval of it in the 1916 Proclamation shows that republicans should not be dogmatic and inflexible on this question. Those first articulaled abstentionism (nOT foresee the political developments that were to take place, nor could they, or Martin McGuiness and Danny Morrison: on the Ard Fheis platform last weekend did they, lay down a course of action with a stipulation that it could never be changed Their political responses were defined by the political conditions that confronted them or that they were apie to cicalt, As te pollica conditions change must republican stragegy change. Therefore present political conditions continue to be the dominant factor in producing a republican response to those conditions.
Participation We should not reject participation out of hand, but we should always be aware that such rejection become essential. It all depends on the objective reality and conditons of the time.
1918 was such a time. The strategy of 1918 was the correct one It was a dual power situation. It was much more than merely refusing to attend any enemy parliament. It meant withholding our consent to be governed by the British when the people -- 110l us. but the people established an alternative to Dal Hireann. But Cvel the republicans made mistake. To a large degree many of those politicians who represented us in Dail Eireann were not republicans. They did not reflect the interests of the people doing the actual fighting. Thus a majority of them found it possible, if not easy, the Treaty al lanceucl Ferocity It was in their own class interests to do so. For this reason they implemented the Treaty with terrible ferocity. they defeated us. With animal savagery, great cruelty and brutality, they imposed the British partition of Ireland upon this nation and they established the Free State and, within a modernised neo-colonial arrangement, they continue those interests which IcolCocil crucify the Irish people.
At that time, many republicans refused to co-operate in any way with the new Free State set-up. At that time, unlike today, abstentionism meant the withholding of all consent to be government by the new state. As In 1918, , this meant much more than merely abstaining from taking their seats It meant refusing to co-operate in any way with the new state. It meant a refusal to recognise any aspect of the Free State, its courts (in both civil and political cases), its education system its labour and agricultural schemes, limited though they were, or even its postal system.
Free State In 1924, Sinn Fein fought its last meaningful election on an abstentionist policy in the Free State. Given the destabilising eflect that abstentionism had on a young Free State, plus the widespicad though mistaken belief that partition would not last, and coupled with the support that we continued to enjoy despite the vicious cruelty of the Civil War Coulie-Icvo argued that abstentionism was the Conca ova a coxHe so, the emergence of Fianna Fail, and its subsequent electoral successes with republican support, marked the end of abstentionism as a viable policy in this state. The coercive policies of the Fianna Fail leadership in government are a matter of record This period is significant not just because of the emergence of Fianna Fail but also, and more significantly, because Fianna Fail received support from many of those who remained committed to republican objectives.
The IRA leadership anda depleted Sinn Fein organisation remained on the high ground of abstentionism but yet, at the same time, they were prepared to give at least passive support to another party which was not only prepared attend Leinster House but was committed becoming part of the partitionis! DystcH They failed to present the people with any realistic political alternative.
Truth Sometimes I ask myself if we will every learn. The central issue is not abstentionism. It is merely problematic, deeply-rooted and emotive symptom of the lack of republican politics and the failure of successive generations of republicans to grasp the cendamental need tor nd phe icar damental need republicar politics This truth must grasped. It is a difficult one fos many to accept given the consor rotor al and repressie se tre our past, our distrust for 'politics and politicians' and a belief that "politics' is inherently corrupt. But once it is grasped then everything eise follows logically, especially the need to develop our struggle at the level ef peoples y nder tan dingane,
with abstentionism Some republicans believe that pollics Is lne properly establishment, 'constitutionalism' and politics are the same thing and thus that politics are inherently corrupt and corrupting. The logic of this is that like many of you, of the so-called depth including consideration to the question of absentionism and of what part it plays in our struggle. I have considered all the alternatives in great dual power situation which is neither feasible nor practical in this state at the present time. Thave considered the The test of a real revolutionary is his or her consistent, determined and intelligent work for real national independence, whatever the area of struggle that might be in. Socialist Action 7 Now 1986
----- pull-quotes -----
Gerry Adam's presidential speech