ty AFTER ishing ears of thement - anti-working class government this century, how can there even be a doubt that Labour can win the election? Even more so given that Thatcher's government, contrary to its claims, is not popular? Thatcher, even if she were to win, may get a lower vote than when the Tories were defeated in 1945.
Yet the record of Labour's populariA ter the disastrous defeat of 1983 the aisastrous aereal Labour's support recovered to 39 per cent in the polls by April 1984. It still stood at 39 per cent in November 1986 - that is no gains were made in more than two and a half years. Since then, after the 1986 conference, Labour's support has fallen to around 30 per cent. Labour stands at a lower position in the polls at the start of the election campaign today than it did in 1983.
In that time each policy advocated by Neil Kinnock and the right wing has been justified by its supposed role in winning this election. How then could the Labour leadership's policies lead to a situation where Labour entered the campaign with its support at such a low level?
To understand look at the policies clearly pursued during the last four years. During that time a bloc of the right wing and the majority of the 'soft left' has led the party. To examine the problems facing Labour today, look at the policies pursued by that bloc.
When he was elected Kinnock was known on the left as the person who, in 1981, ensured the defeat of Tony Benn in the deputy leadership election. Kinnock secured the re-election of Dennis Healey as deputy leader to Michael Foot. It was of course the policies pursued by the Foot-Healey team which led into the disastrous defeat of 1983.
What was involved was more than just individuals or one campaign. Kinnock showed by his actions that he was against the left leading the party which would have been the effect of a Foot-Benn leadership team. Kinnock was determined that the Labour Party should be led by a bloc of the centre and right -with the left excluded from effective Dower.
Kinnock applied the same formula to his own leadership campaign two years later. In the 1983 leadership contest it was clear Kinnock was going to win the election within two weeks of its start. KinLABOUR IS entering the election fighting a deeply unpopular government. Contrary to claims of widespread support Thatcher in 1983 won only 42 per cènt of the poll - the lowest vote for a government with a safe majoriin parliament in British history. This time Tory support is likely to be still lower.
Knock set about ensuring that his deputy would be Roy Hattersley, the candidate Tatic!
Meacher, then the left's candidate for deputy leader.
When it appeared Meacher was gaining ground Kinnock gave an interview to the Mall on Sundav in september 1983 describing Meacher as "weak as hell'. The reasoning which led to the assault on Meacher was summed up by one of Kinnock's aides: Meacher as deputy leader could have been a problem concerned about Hattersley's failure to act.' In addition to knifing Meacher Kinof 1983 nocks team aiso worked Evans and Alex Kitson of the transport workers to ensure the TGWU's vote was acnverca to malicisicy Kinnock fought to ensure that the Foot-Healey centre-right team which had presided over the disastrous defeat of 1983 would be recreated in the new team of Kinnock and Hattersley. At all costs Kinnock Wals should not be a "left' bloc leading the party. This decision dictated the course of the four years that followed. The decision of kind centre must bloc of the right and centre must lead the party was in line with his whole political career. When he was still part of the left, during the 1974-79 Labour government, nock was in favour of left protests.
He was never in favour of the left, or the rank and file, possessing power in the party.
While presenting "democratic socialist, and attacking his opponents for not being Kinnock has consistently shown himself to be an elitist centralist - opposea lo democracy both in the party and society.
This, given the political blocs he supports, is logical strengthens the lett weakens the righe While building himself a left reputation in the 1970s Kinnock always did so from positions which left the real centres of power untouched. He joined the Campaign for (CLPD) soon after its formation in 1973.
But he opposed CLPD's central demand, mandatory reselection of MPs, until 1977 — and then adopted it only when support for this demand had become universal on the left. Kinnock felt that reselection was an attack on the autonomy of the Parliamentary Labour Party — and defended MPs against criticism by those But Labour has been unable to exploit this. , The party is entering the election trailing the Tories by 10 per cent in the polls.
Labour's standing is lower than when the election was announced in 1983 — and it laces an uphill battle. This is despite the fact the right and centre, which outside parliament.
Michael .OI public campaign during the centralist power of the British state.
We were THE FIRST consequences with Moss Labour in 1983, Kinnock's campaign manager that there plained the choice not Wing against them lest we Kinhimself 'democrats, the compliment by every opportunity. - as the extension of lead the party, have justified every policy since 1983 by its supposed role in winning the election. JOHN ROSS looks at how the right wing has sabotaged Labour's run-up to the election — and at Kinnock's four wasted years. Most importantly he looks at what the left must do about it.
Also symptomatic was the one issue which Kinnock made a vigorous 1974-79 Labour government — opposing devolution for Wales. Kinnock defended the On every major issue Kinnock was to take the party to the right. This was the inevitable consequence of the decision to lead the party in alliance with the right.
of Kinnock's policy, and in purely electoral terms the most decisive was that not to undertake any campaign against Labour's most threatening rival for votes — the Alliance. This was despite the fact the Alliance came within a million votes of this election.
and is Labour's main rival in working class seats.
In last week's Tribune Robin Cook, leadership contest, and Labour's campaign manager up to 1986, clearly exto campaign against the Alliance and the results that against followed: Back in 1983 I urged that the only relationship we should contemplate with the Liberals and the SDP was war to against knife... Instead for most of this parliament we have refrained from campaignboost their credibility, which speaks volumes for our confidence in making telling criticisms.
It was even possible last autumn to hear some members lamenting that the Liberals and SDP were not doing better, ped. But in the eccentric hope that it would help us overhaul the Tory lead in the polls 'The Liberals/SDP have not repaid refraining from criticising Labour for fear of enhancing our credibility. They put the boot in at "Time after time documents leaked from the Liberals, or the odd unguarded remark by their leaders, have frankly stated their objective, which is not to put Mrs Thatcher out of office, but to smash Opposition reason that any Labour figure who urges our supporters to cast a tactical vote for the Liberals/SDP is naive beyond belief.' Cook is wrong in explaining why no campaign was carried on against the Alliance. It is because a serious campaign against the Alliance is precluded by a bloc with the right in the Labour Party for the Labour right is increasingly in favour of an agreement with the Alliance.
It is trade union leaders such as Laird, Hammond, and Grantham who have envisaged a deal with the Alliance. It is journals such as the New Statesman which favours tactical voting. It is the right wing that have policies which make possible a coalition with the Alliance -in fact on policy there is little difference between the Labour right and the SDP.
To fight the Alliance it is necessary to unite the left in the party against the right exactly the formula Kinnock and Cook have always rejected. Kinnock, by basing his political line on a bloc with the right, prevented the possibility of any etfective campaign against the Alliance Labour reaped the whirlwind of this at Knowsley North, Greenwich, and in the threat the Alliance poses to Labour's vote. It is anti-Tory votes going to the and not to that threatens to keep Thatcher in power in Kinnock's policy was a refusal to consequence fight the Alliance the second, and most important, was setting the Labour leadership's policy against every mass struggle which developed Thatcher. is in the workplaces, in trade union struggles in demonstrations, in the movement the missiles, in anti-apartheid struggles, in every type of mass campaign and movement, that the real motor of the relation of forces between the classes exists.
Good policies are vital if the potential of struggles which develop are to be tapwithout struggle nothing whatever will be achieved - including achieving the relation of forces to elect a The most disastrous of all Kinnock's policies was failure of the Labour leadership to support the mass struggles that erupted against Thatcher. The Labour leadership thereby aided Thatcher in defeating these struggles, set back the working class, and shifted the relation of forces against This policy started immediately Kinnock was elected leader with the attack launched on the NGA by Eddie Shah at Warrington. No support was given by the Labour leadership to the NGA and supposed 'violence' by the strikers was condemned. The same policy was continued with the lack of practical support given to the Wapping dispute. It reached its culmination in Giles Radice's appeal to the NUT conference for the teachers to call off their strike during the election. Simultaneously with failing to back these struggles the Labour front bench put forward their own proposals that limited right of the trade unions.
Dwarfing all other struggles aga Thatcher was the miners strike Not ly was this the greatest struggle against the government but it was a ly popular struggle inside the work class. This was clear both in the invo ment of hundreds of thousands of wo ing class activists in solidarity with t miners, and in the more passive respor measured by the opinion polls.
As regards the solidarity the Fin cial Times called the miners strike greatest civilian mobilisation since Wo War II'. As regards the polis, by the c of the strike 70 per cent of Labour Pa supporters backed the miners. Even m extraordinary, given the barrage of me hate and hostility, was that at the end the strike polls showed 47 per cent of t population believed the miners had be justified in striking - with 46 per ce disagreeing Forty seven percent of the enti population supporting the miners mea there was an easy majority in their su port inside the working class. It is wor noting that not once in the last tour ye has Labour itself enjoyed 47 perce support! So much for the 'unpopulari of the miners strike.
The Labour front bench's record the strike was disgraceful. It was cle from the outset the government had pi voked the was Clatte organising the attack on it. The gover ment had prepared the strike when opposition.
Tony Benn, in the House of Co mons on 7 June, showed clearly the t tions of the government: "There has be a great deal hypocrisy about! government not intervening. They deeply involved 'The police are preventing peace! picketing. They have set up road bloc introduced curfews in the villages a provoked on the picket lines.
"There have been cavalry char against unarmed pickets.
magistrates have come in and introduced bail conditions that amount to a sentence a sort of exclusion zone for those who have been convicted of nothing... the government have turned off every source of funds, including social security, to starve the miners back to work.' Yet the Labour front bench did not spend its time exposing the preparations and operations of the government but denouncing 'violence' by miners. Kinnock refused to speak at the rallies supporting the miners called by the NUM.
Even within parliament the Labour leadership was pathetic. It forced virtually no debates in the House of Commons on the strike It moved no vote of no confidence in the government. While Campaign Group MPs spoke at over a thousand meetings in support of the miners, the Labour front bench tried to say as little as possible - and what was said was dways directly damaging.
Despite Labour front bench sabotage the impact of the strike on the popularity of the government was clear. popularity began to plummet rapidly in late 1984 as the impact of the strike was felt. Tory support fell from 44 per cent in September 1984 to 36 per cent at the end of the strike. In thè aftermath of the strike it plunged to a low of 30 per cent by September 1985:
By the end of the strike, in March 1985, Labour led the Tories by four per cent in the polls. By September 1985 the Tories were in third place. With Labour leading the Tories in the polls and by the end of the strike more people supporting the miners than opposing them, the miners strike had shitted the entire political situation in Labour's favour.
What smashed that lead was Kinnock's speech to the 1985 Labour Party conference attacking Liverpool council launching the witch hunt. established the drastically right wing tone of the 1985 conference, and set the scene for the two years run in to the general election. As this speech, and its impact, is one of the central myths peddled by the Labour right it is worth looking at the facts of what happened.
to myths Labour's soared after Kinnock's speech to the 1985 party conference. The reality is that the speech, and the right wing 1985 conference as a whole, followed by a rapid deterioration in Labour's position.
In September, the month prior to the 1985 conference, Labour led the Tories by five per cent in the polls. Conservative support was at a low of 30 per cent. In addition to Labour's lead, the Tories had lost support to the Alliance since the summer the miners strike started.
Immediately after ference, and Kinnock's speech, Labour's position began to worsen rapidly. December two months atter the conference, the Tories and Labour were neck and neck — a worsening 01 Labour s position, compared to the Tories, of five months.
Westland crisis, breaking out in January 1986, led to Labour pulling ahead of the Tories again.
The same pattern occurred after the 1986 abour conterence l'his was brobably the most stage managed in the party's history. Hysterical support was given to Kinnock. A svstematic campaign to weaken the lett prior to, and at, the conference saw Eric Heffer and Margaret Beckett removed from the NEC.
As Labour went into the conference it led the Tories by four per cent. Within a month every opinion poll showed the "lories overtaking Labour. By a month later Labour was three per cent behind Lac orIes This of Labour's position compared to the Tories in two months. The right wing conferences of 1985 and 1986 were not simply politically but even more ridiculous was that Liverpool council had never lacked popular sup campaigns against Labour the council right wing consistently won the local government popularity elections despite a policy of blatant bribery by the interim administration of Sir Trevor was Jones Economist last week was forced to comment: "The three point rise in Labour's share of the votes since last year suggests that most of Liverpool's working class voters have accepted Militant's explanation of Liverpool's financial crisis. The continuing collapse of the Tory vote -only 9½ per cent of Liverpudlians now vote Tory. 1985 con- version has been rejected by Liverpool's By voters of Liverpool could see the Labour leadership could not!
ly this year was not in Liverpool but where Labour's right wing policies hit Only the home - once again made worse by the Switch hunt. As Ken Livingstone summarised in last week's Tribune: light of particularly bad (local governright) should be honest and accept that the publicity generated by •tersley's letter warning Linda Bellos and Bernie Grant to stay out of "his"
Labour vote in Birmingham. Also the Tory happened without the ecutive Committee's disgraceful removal of Sharon Atkin.
damaged electorally What made these Labour own goals Even this year, after the Liverpool disqualtied - have made well entrenched. won again. The goes into the election.
- shows that the government's However what the they are Where Labour did devastatingly badding in ment) results in the Midlands they (the in 1966 Roy Hatcity backfired, producing the collapse of the and IMF capture of Nottingham would not have National Exits potential voters.
The hysterical publicity generated by the witch hunt against the Labour Party Black Section following its meeting in Birmingham undoubtedly backfired and loyalty, electorally in the assaulted The Alliance, Labour's main electoral rival, are in fact quite clear that it policy llas Socialist Action votes. reform every is corrupt right wing Labour administrations which provide them with their easiest targets. Tony Greaves, organiser of Liberal councillors, noted in Liberal News in March: 'where the hard left is most entrenched - Lambeth, Camden. Haringey and Brent - the Liberal and Alliance presence is sparse. Where we substantial lasting breakthroughs, the hard left has not been In Tower Hamlets (where the Alliance made spectacular gains) all the advances were made while the rotten old right, white, middle aged and male, still ran the council.' Taking these policies into account it is clear why labour trails in the polls as it With its policies Labour has assaulted its core supporters. The trade unions, the deprived cities such as Liverpool and Inner London, are the bedrock of Labour's support. How far successful in their struggle against Thatcher determines whether the relation of forces exists to elect a Labour The Labour leadership has svstematical v talled to support. and ir many cases directly assaulted, the core of Labour s potental support In these circumstances Labour's stanthe polls scarcely to wondered at. It is as suicidal a course as when Wilson introduced incomes policy which delivered Labour's popularity a blow from which it has never recovered, or when Wilson and Callaghan introduced the incomes policy cuts in 1975-76 which created the conditions for Thatcher to be elected in 1979. No party ever gained support by openly attacking those who torm Furthermore it is not just Labour's long term supporters that have been attacked. Any new group which it is imporhas systematically The most brutal has been the assault on the black community. Here the party's been simply, and bluntly, racist. Every black newspaper in the country, many very far from radical, has denounced the deselection of Sharon Atkin and the attack on the Labour Party Black Section. It takes no intelligence to know what is involved when an MP like Frank Field, who directly calls for a vote against Labour, has no action taken against him but when a black PRC, such as Sharon Atkin, is removed. It is pandering to racism.
In terms of the simplest electoral calculation the most extreme refusal of the labour right to take up what 1 necessary comes with women. Labour's 45...
own opinion polls snow that womichag ed 25-45 are the key group for winning opinion polis done for Weekend World on 10 May show tha women, together with young people in general, are the key voters who can be persuaded to change their mind. The In! dependent of 15 May noted: "Two opi nion polls conducted by MORI last month show • among women voters, particularly in the 25-34 age group,. allegiances are weakening. When support for the Conservatives has dropped, it has dropped fastest in this group But, apart from Jo Richardson's heroic struggle to get the policy of a Ministry for Women with Cabinet status accented. has rejected every that would have produced a powerful Labour women's organisation. The energies of Labour women to go out and win women voters to Labour have been totally thwarted.
It is these policies which explai why Labour is facing an uphil battle in the election. The Labour leadership has assaulted almost single that possibly be won to support It has also attacked, or deserted, Labour's potential international allies and kev international struggies. it nas backpedalled on unilateral nuclear disarmament, it has refused to give an une: quivocal pledge to break all links with apartheid, it has refused to promise real aid to Nicaragua, it has refused to take the decision to withdraw from Ireland.
This determines what has to be the key task of the left during the campaign, and after. It has to support all the mass struggles taking place during the election — starting with the civil servants who are so correctly continuing their strike action during the election. It has to be able to put together the coalition of forces that can rebuild the mass support of the movement means understanding that the decisive relation of forces between the classes is not generated in elections, and still less in the House of Commons, but in the mass struggles that take place between elections and outside parliament. It means understanding that Labour can win support only by itselt supporting, and not repudiating, those who form the base of the labour movement - and defending all the organisations, above all the trade unions, that form the base of the Labour means understanding Labour must put together a great alliance or forces which i support — the traditional working class, the unemployed, the population of Wales and Scotland, women, the black community and its in‚ternational allies.
Labour can still do well in these elections. Hatred of the Thatcher government is so deep, and the Alliance are so much more clearly becoming seen as second class Tories, that despite Kinnock's record of the last four years the working class may turn out to vote Labour. But l woe desoile not occausc ol. wilai has been done under Neil leadership.
If Labour is ever to be rebuilt as a truly mass force, above all if we are ever to have a Labour government again, a totally different policy to that of the last four years must be pursued.
Socialist Action ON 11 JUNE supposedly the highest democratic authority British society, a general election, will take place. But on that day, while 635 MPs, and a government, will be elected, no elections will take place either in the great institutions of the state or in the com-