analyses the outcome of the French elections.
THE performance of Mitterrane Cane Tenca Socialist Party in the electhe French assembly can only be described snatching defeat from the jaws of Mitterrand entered the election with the clear project, not powerful victory, but of forright/SP government with a section of the right. Support from any section of the right looked less likely the greater the SP victory - hence the feeble mobilisation by the Socialist Party.
However, this tactic has rebounded on Mitterrand, and instead of a relatively comfortable five years of office, with the Socialist Party dictating terms to the 'centre' parties the SP is now sueezca between d strong CP group of delegates, and the right -which will be able to dictate the terms of its support for the government.
Mitterrand's personal success the presidential elections, and the retusal of the centre parties to come to any agreewith the minority socialist government 'Rocard in the pre-general election assembly, had laid the basis for a striking victory by ine renen socialist Coalition In fact, as far as Mitterrand and the leadership or the SP was concerned, this was precisely the problem The SP looked like winning a crushing majority over all its right-wing rivals.
It was this eventuality when vuitterrand was concerned to avoid. His gal majority government, but with a narrow enough majority for the pressure to be maintainTHE TWO weeks leading up to the first round of the elections to the French National Assembly saw an apparently bizarre spectacle - a party campaigning against achieving too great a victory. As a headline in the Observer put it Socialists fear landslide. In the event the French Socialists under Mitterrand and Rocard so demobilised their own supporters that not merely didn't they win a landslide, but they didn't even secure an overall majority in the Assembly.
Mitterrand's clear project was to prevent this being created, to instead build up an alternative Eurosocialist line, and the clear centre right parties of the rignt-wing coannon, on c line of support for big European capital.
obstacles confronted Mitterrand on this course. First the SP had to be built up to completely eliminate the CP on its leftflank. In this project MitTerrane was acca Dy LIC sectarianism of the CP ir failing to call for unity o the French workers movesecondly the reorientation of the French bourgeoisie from its old "softness' towards the Soviet towards alliance with West Germany allowed no within bourgeois politics for the CP's international line.
Throughout the early and mid 70s Mitterrand maintained the SP on a left line arguing for unity of the left, and finally achieving success 1981 elections. This 'left' orientation through the 70s ensured the dominance of the SP over the CP within the left, and ensured that when the CP finally broke the electoral Dae Wine 10304 the advantage entirely went to the SP.
Despite Mitterrand's right turn the absence of unity on the left is seen as the responsibility of the CP, and from the point of view of the French bourgeoisie, has always been interested in it made the sP a more useful instrument, not less.
The long term decline of the French CP. exploite ably by Mitterrand for his own ends, had reduced the CP to 7 per cent of the vote in the first round of the presidential elections.
SYLVIA LEE attempt to achieve a deal with Juquin for the assembly election - a successful "modernisation" of the party through structures like the Women's Ministry - when won a con female vote in the presidential elections and blocking any closer relationship between the SP and the traditionally SP aligned trade union federa tion, the CFDT.
The separation between is a vital component of Mitterrand's sulaley result, despite the precipitous decline of the CP, the CP-aligned federation, the CGT, remains the most powertur tradc union federation in France.
However eliminating the left is not enough. Mitterrand has to draw in some clement or te bourgols parties in order to secure his DIOCCL and this was his goal at this election.
Through weakening and undermining the right-wing block between the UDF and veterane aimed te cement an alliance between the SP the bourgeois parties. . Such an within which the SP was dominant, would act as a guarantee to the bourgeoisie for the actions of the government.
Equally Mitterrand is concerned that the rightwing programme he pro jects for the government should appear to be the result of constraints imposed by coalition with forces outside the SP. This was the meaning of 'opening out.
A crushing majority for the Socialist Party would have reinforced the alliance between the centre and right-wing parties as auntied opposition, would have undermined can both defeat the old Gaullist right, and be acceptable to the bourgeoisie option.
In this context the party which was the least worried about the growth in support one ren ane me extent fascist right was the SP. The of relatively strong extreme right cutting into the support for Chirac and creating tensions within the 'centre/right coalition was not without interest for Mitterrand's project.
A powertu victorv tol the Socialist Party woul not have aided Mitterrand's project. However, Mitterrand's tactic has backfired, for neither did he wish to be caught in a trap between the CP on the one hand and the centre parties on the other.
There Mitterrand is going to take his party into another coalltion with the Communist Party, but an important CP bloc of assembly members will be a thorn in the side of the government if Mittertre deputies to vote for his rand cannot convince policies. Failure The tailure to secure ar overall majority for the SP means that Mitterrand Is not in control of the situation. The SP has to form ar agreement with a section of the right. However this wil be on the terms of the right for as soon as this support the govern ment would fall It is self-evident that the CP will not vote to keep Mitterrand in office, and the last thing Mitterranc would want is • to be relian the CP anyway. Therefore rather than having two or three years to work out exactly how to on what terms. Mitterrand and Rocard are now posed with the task of forging an agreement rapidly - anc one which will last.
This effectively makes the SP government the prisoner of the right.
Left Mitterrand's tactic of demobilising the SP's vote Was the higher vote for the CP ill-judged. Moreover in the assembly election, which pushed its percentage up to 11.8, indicates that there was some dissatisfaction among a part of SP voters about Mitterrand's strategy of 'opening out'or more accurately alliance with the right Alongside this the result may well strengthen Le Pen and the extreme right. Th failure of the right in the presidential election, where sanere was no ascemen Le Pen, the relative success of the right in the second round of the assembly elections, where there was an electoral agree ment with Le Pen, will allow Le Pen's supporters to argue the right can only SerOUs \ alliance with the National Mitterrand's course of seeking coaltion with bourgeois parties to pursue a policy in the interests of big capital l simply the sharpest example of a trend throughout the socialist parties in Europe The response of the lett must be to call on the Socialist Party to abandon SP/CP government. This is the cor rect response to the out to the right-wing road that Mitterrand has mapped out both for the socialist party and the workers movement in France.