'When we started out, there were waverers hearts. The people thought that Britain could no longer seize the initiative for herself. The people thought we could no longer do the great things which we once did. Those who thought that our decline was irreversible — that we could never again be what we were.
There were those would not admit it - even perhaps here today — people who would have strenuously denied the suggestion but -in their heart of they too had secret fears that it was true; that Britain was no longer the nation that had built an Empire and ruled a quarter of the world. Well they were wrong.
"The lesson Falklands is that Britain has not changed and that this nation still has those sterling qualities which shine through our history?
That was the central part of the message delivered by Margaret Thatcher to 5,000 ecstatic Tories assembled Cheltenham race course on 3 July 1982, her first major speech after the Falklands war.
At the same time the lones were registering over 50 per cent in the opinion polls, enough to give them a landslide victory in an election. Since that time the Falklands has had a lasting effect on British political life.
Positive As soon as the war was over the Social Services Minister decrying 'the lack of Falklands spirit' among the health workers long list of strikers who had this charge hurled against them.
Most of all the war was a terrible warning to the labour movement, that international political questions can be used to generale a carniva or rcacuon and that only a determined internationalist response can prevent it.
The invasion of the Falklands came like a bolt out of the blue. The usually Socialist Action taintwho who nouncing the speech over the islands.
who hearts The issue and '40s.
Not Falkland Islanders Britain's greater duty to: of the ple of the Falklands Islands.' opposition.
dow.
interests, was followed by Enoch David Owen unanimity.
Fowler was tions • ULC OI • was making cessful military engagement.
SAS units tine aircraft Argentinian soldiers discover British marines at start of the invasion astute Economist in its edition of the week leading up to the invasion devoted fleet. only a small article to the possibility that British submarines might be in the For the first time in two decades the Commons met on a Saturday, 3 April. Thatcher seemed in deep trouble. The Tories were angry at the delay in aninvasion une was Foreign Office's incompetence in not foreseeing it. Thatcher made a bellicose tle British sovereignly But stil there were doubters would Britain really get involved in a Massive shooting war over faraway islands with a population the size of a village?
was settled Michael Foot's speech. He argued that the invasion was unbridled aggression comparable to fascist aggression in the '30s only the defence of the was at stake, but 'uphold the rights of our country to be the defender oi people's freedom throughout the world, particularly those who look to us for special protection, as do the peoFoot's speech was the turning point in the debate. Any wavering about the despatch of the Task Force was dispelled. The possibility of building a really madness was thrown out of the winEdward Du Cann, leading backbencher and representative of City jumped to congratulate Foot whom he said 'spoke for us all'. Du Cann down Powell who echoed these sentiments. For the SDP, completed the Only The naval Task Force arrived in the South Atlantic on 22 April. During the had two and a half weeks it took to get there, nearly all serious commentators had regarded its sending as a show of force designed to get serious negotiaOnce again, the Economist talked about an inevitable agreement' which would have to be reached with the Argentinians. This was also of course the position of Foot and the SDP. But Willingly right from the very beginning Thatcher preparations IOT a sucwere despatched to Argentina via Chile to monitor ArgenNuclear weapons were installed on the British But the most significant evidence that Thatcher would not tolerate any serious negotiations was the sinking on 2 May of the General Belgrano with the loss of at least 300 lives. The Belgrano made future negotiations — which the United States desperately trying to get through Secretary of State Haig's shutdiplomacy impossible.
Belgrano was sunk outside the exclusion zone on its way back to base.
The decision sink criminal act, designed by Thatcher to ensure a continuing military conflict which she could win of the reason for that was Thatcher's determination to score a military victory. But there was more to it than narrow Tory calculation The Falklands war challenged Britain's world military economic position. Despite the decline of the domestic economy, Britain owns £84 billion worth of capital abroad.
Britain thus remains a maior im perialist power. To protect what Foot calls 'our position in the world' tens of thousands of British troops are stretch ed out across the world in dozens of countries. British banks are among the biggest in the world. All this is in marked contrast to Argentina. Conflict The small island with capitalism decided to use its military might to demonstrate very publicly the world, that Britain remained an imperialist power not to be challenged.
determination to Galtieri Was expression that. Her military victory may seem on the surface to have been a close run thing. But in fact there could have been outcome to the conflict, especially once the Belgrano incident made it impossible for American's to stay neutral and maintain their 'mediator' image.
remains immeasureably more powerful than any semi-colonial power militarily and economically.
The full power of the press and television was mobilised to reinforce patriotism and national chauvinism Whine man papers done is le boundless thusiasm, whipping up an almost racist hysteria against 'Argies', the rest of the press was effectively censored by 'news management'.
The BBC was subject to furious attack because a Panorama programme raised some mild questions about the going The was a through Lord Carrington war. The recently revealed Ministry of Defence plans to effectively militarise reporters in the event of the danger or war, by prescribing who will be given military uniforms reflects the news management of the Falklands war. he rranks Report on the war laughably accepted the mecla ine on lne war and vindicated everyone involved -ington, Nott - the lot!
Thus the war strengthened racism and national chauvinism. It weakened the movement. lories an victory. sibility for all that, or at least that there was no significant national force to big challenge it, is directly due to the sancto tion given by Foot to the sending of the During the war itself Michael Foot bring at various times appealed to Thatcher to hold off OI chance. But he was hoisted on his own petard. Once having agreed that it was vital to send the Task Force, he was in an impossible position negotiations once the military conflict the had begun.
A section of the labour movement and its parliamentary leadership, did of course call for the withdrawal of the fleet - notably Tony Benn and Judith Hart. But the demonstrations were too small to have a serious impact. importance lies in the preparation of ar alternative position on. the Falklands for when the question arises again, as il inevitably will Reaction On an international level, Britain's victory only served the interests of reaction. No matter how reactionary the government of Argentina - and many people discovered character of the regime much later than the left who opposed the war - the conflict was seen everywhere as a war between a leading imperialist power and a minor power, which is still a dependent country, foreign capital.
The support given to Argentina by countries arose not from some sort of 'Latin American chauvinism', understanding that Britain was fighting to shore up world imperialism. The 'lesson' of the war is 'don't tamper with the big imperialist states or they'll give you a bloody nose'.
'safe' reporters government/ • Thatcher, CarrIt gave the The responand give negotiations a to demand Their 'fascist' Argentinian dominated by to power. vious like Cuba and Nicaragua but from • aI and ultimately workers move. permanent objective of virtually any government which comes The consequences are obThere will be repeated attempts to re-capture the Malvinas for Argentina. and in the long term the occupation of the islands is untenable. Eventually the cost of the occupation and the logistica. difficulties will tell. At present prices the government intends to spend f600m a year on the garrisoning of the islands — £1 ½m for each Falkland family.