ONE OF THE curious features of European politics at the present time is that Washington is imposing far greater monolithism states than is being Moscow.
It is just not on for a NATO regime to oppose Pershing even lo ask for the dualkey. The most that was allowed was for Greece to ask for SiX months postponement of deployment. Washington also tried to impose monolithism relations with the East, Reagan's drive for will economic warfare against although IVIOSCOW.
West European resistance on this issue has been more successful, Washington Continues twisting.
In contrast, East European governments have taken a sharply divergent stand on and on economic relations Husak in will une West.
Prague is the Thatcher of Warsaw Pact, 'calling LIC for' missiles to deployed Czechoslovakia. And Honecker's acceptance of Soviet missiles great public voicing of dis was accompanied quiet.
Meanwhile Hungary reputedly resist Soviet pressure for missies Zhivkoy in Bulgaria said This would lidl never accept nuclear weapons on its territory - on the West done in Eastern Europe by general Eastern bloc line, local and regional features are being increasingly emDas sed LIC LOCISI policies of the Comecon At end, Bulgaria is pre-occupied with Balkan issues, lining up witn Greece TOr nuclear-free zone groping for a link-up with Albania.
At the other end, the GDR is increasingly preoccupied with maintaining economic with Bonn. Czechosloits neighbours by establishing Thatcherstyle 'special relationship' with its bloc leadership (Moscow).
The source of these centrifugal trends can only partly explained by Soviet flexibility. The much more likely reason is the protracted crisis in the Kremlin. During the slug gish years of Brezhnev's dotage, , Moscow was overwhelmingly pre-occupied with one issue in Eastern europe the Polish revolution. Europe welcome the extra margin of manoeuvre that the Soviet leadership crisis aliows them. At the same Luic they nervous because of the uncertainties over Moscow's future course and are feverishly lobbying for answers that favour their own particular interests come our trom the russies witn the Kremlin.
these issues dwarf all others as far as Juruzelski: would welcome more freedom from Moscow the Bulgarians. The dominant group within the Czechoslovak regime would be hostile to such a reform.
but It 1S the issue of economic relations with the West that is probably the most sensitive issue for the other Comecon governments. A sharp turn towaros awarky would do welcomed the Husak regime and by a powerful group in Poland. It would cause a major crisis in both Hungary and the GDR.
Chernenko's victory has been welcomed most by those who oppose economic reforms, but insofar follows deals with the West as the priority Soviet policy abroad, this will be welcomed the East regimes dependent East-West HUs. trade. But the longer that the drift continues in Moscow, NOTe difficult it will be for Moscow the line in COWI Eastern Europe. Mass trials like this have convicted tens of thousands of socialists and workers in Turkes