development in the Salvadorean revolution.
claim their own particular victory.
that they should arrange to talk again.
As Socialist Action pointed out in its last issue, the real power centre in the rotten Salvadorean éstablishment, the army — not to mention Uncle Sam would not have Duarte negotiate any real concessions to the rebels.
He merely repeated his totally unacceptable offer rillas would lay down their arms and take part in 'free elections'. Equally FAL RED tably, the showed not the least sign of agreeing ' to any such thing until DASO demands were met.
As if to demonstrate that it was usual, immediately after Ine talks ended the Salvadorean army launched a big push Hild north eastern guerrilla stronghold of Morazan, in an attempt 'to get the guerrilla commanders in bo'as they mend sal the outcome of the talks As usual, nothing.
CIA Just to drive the point home, on the Friday the CIA managed to fly one of its spy-planes into hillside San Salvador. This exposed 'Casey's boys' are down there, sorting out the civilian targets 'guerrilla sympathisers' that need to be bombed back into line.
So why were the talks important, and what kind of victory could anyone claim? indeed, did The anster tas something answer has something EI Salvador, after four war, Clauswitz's famous old maxim has been turned Both sides described them as such, and both sides could Yet the only thing the talks actually decided was on its head: politics have become the continuation of war by other means.
Both sides need break out of the relative impasse they encounter or the military terrain. This impasse 1IUL total stagnation. It is a fluid semi-stalemate which has been drifting unevenly favour of the FMLN.
But with the stepped up level US technological and logistic supthe revolutionar forces have not been able to go beyond the spectacular gains they made in the latter part of last yeal to lesser degree earlier this year. They do not have any immediate SOOSDECI defeating the government forces.
On the other side, it is clear that the army can do FMLN; it has no chance of For Duarte there are only two options: either he forces major climb-down by the revolumust realise most the ground for massive direct imperialist intervention.
It just possible, though unlikely, that Duarte himself has sufficient megalomaniac belief in his own role as 'saviour' of the nation to kid himself that his call to negotiations step towards the former solution It is much more certain that the Salvadorean army renlagon masters see the negotiadiplomatic step towards Duarte the latter, military, soluFor the revolutionaries, last week's talks have been a different kind of boost. The FMLN-FDR demanding unconditional negotiations 1982. For the first time, the Salvadorean governmen has conceded to this deand been seen b the eyes of the whole world recognise the revolutionaries genuine belligerent force.
Perhans more importantly, the meeting in La the FMLN a new prestige and profile within Salvador. For the fact is that there is undoubtedly a large section the Salvadorean people, including many workers and peasants, who, while they may have a basic sympathy with the revolutionaries cause, nave nau no wirec contact with it, at least was massacred wholesale These people are fed up killing discouraged by the only information they do receive about the revolutionary struggle, the misinformation of the regime's press, radio and television.
Last Monday gave the FMLN-FDR their first ever opportunity to speak directly to these people, on every radio and television station in the country, and firm serious alternative to all these sectors.
In the end, the important thing is not what was He Don Duie ac they talked at all. Only the will show which side is able to turn of the struggle to their best advantage.
As the FMLN statement says, negotiations are a complement to the armed struggle, not substitute for it.