ingly endless death agony of Brezhnevism is finally over. The Soviet Union, whatever the intentions of the since the fall of Khrushchev 21 years ago.
Constantin Chernenko's seemingly eternal moment of power only reinforced the certainty of future turbulence inside ine ruling elite, for the simple reason that Chernenko did not do anyuning. halt Andropors plans: not a single new policy initiative, not a single new appointment to the top leadership. This was lo be expected from a man whose base within the apparatus didn't stretch much beyond the breznnevite malla the often very corrupt network brought into leading Brenneypositiass during years Chernenko did what they required, toning down Andropov's anti-corruption drive and postponing a leadership purge As Chernenko sank matia seems to have sought to rally around the Moscow party boss, Grishin, a man who had himsell been increasingly threatened by drive azallist ruption Andropov's time. But the move to draft Grishin was evidently flop and Andropov's own protege, Gorbachev, was the central Collilice.
This ends a period of immobılisation within the Soviet leadership that stretches back to the end of the 1970s. At least for the last five veals. LIC MOTO alert aware of the younger generation of the party elite have been daily wits or Breze spot witnesses the policies: in both industry and • CLUTe declining growth and stag nation; in foreign poncy.
search for en agreemeht search as coachil WITh the In Soviet sater, rod disenchant- demoralIsaulot ment amongst workers and young people, and spreading cynicısm corrupuon witnin ine middie classes the bureauCal V. Calastroonc failure Brezhnev's management of the East satellite belt, demonstrated in growing centritugal presthroughout the halt the trend; China policy that had dısa s trously backfired since it UlLY made sense on the basis relations with the USA; a seemingly endless struggle in Afghanistan; the almost complete loss of genuine ideological authority within the world Communist movement, not off-set attempt to enhance Soviet security Nith the exception of the Polish crisis, none of WITH THE burial of Constantin Chernenko, the seemthese problems has posed a direct threat to the Soviet slalc anu oureaucrareaucrats life coulding Clay. For the less undisturbed, and people coming Torward witn therefore dangerous ideas ting Chernenko into office But the perspectives and strategy has had the effect of radicalising the thinking of some sectors the elite, Dalticularly within the intelligentsia.
Voices have been raised, declaring that the problems go beyond this or that of policy and ivolve une enure structure of the Soviet LIve sysicIn was formed in the 1930s under Stalin. The idea has been put forward that the roots of the economic stagnation are not economic at all but political: the workers' lack of control over any part of the system une conscoven cenoraisation alienation. has OCCO suggested that the elite has acquired a set ot social interests different potentialiv antagonistic to, the interests of the workers and that consequently any reform of the system will require mOle SOme decrees above: there must also be a movement from below.
It is. oi course. Impos. sible to know how far ideas these nave penttrated within the middle ranks of LIlC colmunisI They were being voiced party meetings under Andropov as intellectuals hoped he might turn out to be the sort enlightened despot who could force through change. The likelihood thạt Chernenko's tenure has Turther radicalised such thinking.
also, . now, strong evidence of factional groups operating within the leadership, with some elements clearly alligned with the Andropovvorbacnev circle over ine last couple of years, and others lined them. The extent to which these factions alc ulcallised around elaborate sets policies much less clear, although in the field of external policy, Andro•Gorbachev have evidently been associated with a drive towards major improvements in relations When will la enernenko became general secrelav inere was some sort of deal within the politburo to contam LOS tional struggle, but with Chernenko® gone. the logjam has been brokent.
Gorbachev's recent speeches have indicated bulls ot the ways in which he will respond to these conditions. First and foremost, he is stressing party discipline: in other words, warning inc trustralca raulcals lower down the apparatus not to step out of line bv alempung any authentic movement from below tor reform. Gorbachev is anything but a radical seeking undermine the power and privileges the bureaucratic caste.
Secondly, the old Andropov slogan of cracking down on corrupt ele ments has been revived and mafia by the police will be aimed both the more radical elements that Casulle change in personnel firmly controlled above.
Gorbachev's background suggests that his horizons are limited to technocratic solutions will alter nothing in the way of basic structures of bureaucrati rule. He will have to mov swiftly to prepare the renewal of both policy and personnel before the next party congress at the end of the year, and he can be expected then to be tested by those 1n the middle ranks hoping for some sort Soviet revival. If this fails to materialise by the last years of the decade, the USSR will be plunged into late 1920s Is DIsgest cuss since mn Gorbachev
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new general secretary, Mikhail Gorbachev, is entering a period of greater change and flux than at any time