analyses the outcome of the French elections.
THE performance of Mitterrand the French Socialist Party in the elections to the French assembly can only described as snatching defeat from the jaws o victory.
Mitterrand entered the ject, not of winning powerful victory, but of foring an agreement for : 'centre right/St ment with a section of the right. Support from any section of the right looked less likely the greater the SP victory - hence the feeble mobilisation by the Socialist Party.
However, this tactic has rebounded on Mitterrand, and instead of a relatively comfortable five years of office, with the Socialist Party dictating terms to the the SP is SUIORS delegates, and the right -which will be able to dictate the terms of its support tor the government.
Mitterrand'S personal success the elections, and the refusal of the centre parties to come to any agreement with Sine minority socialist government of косата in me pre-genera. election assembly, had laid the basis for a striking victory by the French Socialist Coalition In fact, as far as Mitterrand and the leadership of the SP was concerned, this was precisely the problem.
The SP looked like winnin a crushing majority over ai its right-wing rivals.
It was this eventuality which Mitterrand was concerned to avoid. His goal was for a majority SP government, but with a narrow enough majority the pressure to be maintainTHE TWO weeks leading up to the first round of the elections to the French National Assembly saw an apparently bizarre spectacle — a party campaigning demobilised their own supporters that not merely didn't they win a landslide, but they didn't even secure an overall majority in the Assembly.
Mitterrand's clear project was to prevent tnis bemg created, to instead up alternative political force, composed of clear "Eurosocialist" line, and the centre right parties of the right-wing coalition, on a support for big European capital.
Two obstacles confronted Mitterrand on this course. First the SP had to be built up to completely eliminate the CP on its left flank. In this project Mitterrand was aided by tne sectarianism of the CP ir failing to call for unity of the French workers movement, ase secondly t reorientation of the French bourgeoisie trom is old "softness" towards the SOVC towards alliance with West Germany allowea no space within bourgeois politics for the CP's international line.
Throughout PEDe and mid 70s Mitterrand maintained the SP on a left line, arguing for unity of the left, and finally chieving success in the 1981 elections. This left' orientation through the 70s ensured the dominance of the SP over the CP within the left, and ensured thạt when the CP pact with the SP in 1984. the advantage entirely went to the SP.
Despite Mitterrand's right turn the absence of unity on the left is seen as the responsibility of the CP, and from the point of view of the French bourgeoisie, which is what Mitterrand has always been interested in, it made the SP a more useful instrument, not less.
The long term de of the French CP, exploite ably by Mitterrand for his own ends, had reduced the CP to 7 per cent of the vote in the first round of the presidential elections.
SYLVIA LEE attempt to achieve a deal WILl for the assembly election — a suc cessful "modernisation' of the party through structures like the Women's Ministry — wnien won mim a majorfemale vote in the presidential elections blocking any closer relationship between the SP and the traditionally SP aligned trade union federation, the CFDT.
The separation between is a vital component of MitTerranes result, despite the precipitous decline of the CP, the CP-aligned federation, the CGT, remains the most powerful trade union federation in France.
However eliminating the left is not enough. Mitterrand has to draw in some element of the bourgeois parties in order to secure his project, and as was us goal at this election.
Through weakening and undermining the right-wing block between the UDF and RPR, Mitterrand aimed to cement an alliance between Ine or KEne bourgeois parties. . Such an aliance within which the SP was dominant, would aliasa guarantee to the bourgeoisie for the actions of the government.
Equally Mitterrand is concerned that the rightwing programme he projects the government should appear to be the result of constraints imposed by coalition with forces outside the SP. This was the meaning of 'opening out.
A crushing majority tor the Socialist Party would have rein forced the alliance between the centre and right-wing parties as united opposition, would have undermined Mitterrand's project can both defeat the old Gaullist right, and be acceptable to the bourgeoisie as a longterm governmental option.
In this context the party Wen Was Be as wonce about the growth in support fascist right was the SP. The existance ota relatively strong extreme right cutting into the support for Chirac and creating tensions within the 'centre/right coalition WAS BOW OURCESO Mitterrand's project.
A powerful victory for the Socialist Party would not have aided Mitterrand's project. However, Mitterrand's tactic has backfired for neither did he wish to be caught in a trap between the Cr on the one hand and the centre parties on the other There is no way ina Mitterrand is going to take his party into another coall tion with the Communist Party, but an important CP bloc of assembly members will be a thorn in the side of rand cannot convince 'centre deputies to vote for his policies. Failure The failure to secure an overall majority for the SI means that Mitterrand 1 not in control of the situation. The SP has to form an agreement with a section o the right. However this will be on the terms of the right for as soon as this support is witnarawn tac govern ment would fall.
It is self-evident that the CP will not vote to keep Mitterrand in office, and the last thing Mitterrand would want is to be reliant the anyway. Therefore rather than having two or three years to work out exactly how to dea with the situation and on what terms. Mitterrand and Rocard are now posed with the task of forging an agreement rapidly one which will last.
This effectively makes the government the prisoner of the right.
Left Mitterrand's tactic of demobilising the SP's vote was ill-judged. Moreover, the higher vote for the CP in the assembly election, when pusnca is percentag up to 11.8, indicates that there was some dissatisfaction among a part of SP voters about Mitterrand's strategy of opening out or more accurately alliance with the right.
Alongside this the result may well strengthen Le Pen and the extreme right. The failure of the right in the presidential election, where there *was agreement with Le •Pen. relative success of the right in the second round of the assembly elections, where ment with Le Pen, will allow Le Pen's supporters to seriously advance alliance with the National Front Mitterrand's course of seeking coalition with bourgeois parties to pursue a policy in the interests of European capital is simply the sharpest example of a trend throughout the socialist parties in Europe The response of the left must be to call On Socialist Party to abandon this project, and raise the demand for SP/CP government. This is the correet response to the outcome of the elections, and to the right-wing road that Mitterrand has mapped out both for the socialist party and the workers movement in France.
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against achieving too great a victory. As a headline in the Observer put it 'Socialists fear landslide. In the event the French Socialists under Mitterrand and Rocard so